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Abstract 
The crisis since August 2007 provides an opportunity to observe the workings of 
good governance institutions under an extreme stress test and in radically 
different political settings. Institutions such as independent central banks, fiscal 
rules and regulatory oversight of public finances were meant to depoliticize 
macroeconomic stabilization. The comparison of crisis management in the 
United States and in the European Union shows that the amount of fiscal 
stimulus and monetary easing engineered is surprisingly similar. Yet good 
governance institutions are in crisis in the US while it has been a good crisis for 
governance in the EU (until the Greek turmoil). To interpret this as politicization 
of macroeconomic policy in the US and successful depoliticization in the EU is 
misleading, however. The boundaries between economic stabilization and 
distributive politics have been wiped out in the US exactly because the 
authorities prioritized economic stabilization. In the EU, the boundaries as 
drawn are inimical to joint stabilization efforts but this is exactly why they are 
politically self-enforcing, even though they are economically costly. They are not 
the embodiment of economic rationality that their proponents once thought. 
A revised version of this working paper is forthcoming in the Review of 
International Political Economy (RIPE). 
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Good Governance in Crisis or a Good 
Crisis for Governance?  
A Comparison of the EU and the US 
 
1. Introduction 
The financial and economic crisis since August 2007 confronted policymakers with 
unprecedented challenges. European governments were seen by most observers as 
responding too timidly. An obsession with institutions of good macroeconomic 
governance, such as fiscal rules and the separation of monetary from fiscal authority, 
seemed to contribute to inertia in Europe, as the chief economist of the IMF among 
others alleged (Blanchard 2009; cf Krugman 2009, Wyplosz 2009).  In this view, the 
EU compared badly with the US government under President Obama which was 
congratulated for its bold fiscal response, tightly coordinated with monetary policy. 
Two prominent economists concluded that sacrosanct institutions like central bank 
independence or fiscal rules have to be abandoned if governments are to stabilize 
effectively (Buiter 2009; De Grauwe 2009). However, until early 2010 the EU response 
has proven to be politically robust despite the alleged functional flaws while the 
response in the US has come under serious political attack in Congress. 
The jury on the effectiveness of each response is still out and will be out for years to 
come. At this stage, the comparison of the responses in the EU and the US provides 
us with an opportunity to study how major institutions of ‘good governance’ 
actually worked in contrast to how they were meant to work, in different political 
settings and under the stress test of the Great Recession. After the breakdown of the 
early post-war consensus about activist, fiscal policy-led stabilization, economists 
justified institutions like fiscal rules, independent central banks and regulatory 
oversight as attempts to ‘depoliticize’ macroeconomic stabilization. They would 
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isolate in particular monetary policy against the influence of electoral or distributive 
politics (Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983). Like other 
manifestations of the ‘regulatory state’ (Pildes and Sunstein 1995, Majone 1996), these 
institutions could be justified as correctives to shortcomings of representative 
democracy that tends to ignore the outsiders of current electoral politics, such as 
neighboring countries or future generations. Institutions of good governance would 
bring economic rationality to stabilization, a realm of policymaking that should not 
be ruled by distributive concerns.1  Not all of these institutions were new as such; eg 
the Fed was already an independent central bank. But they were justified on new 
grounds. The idea was to tie governments’ hands, delegate macroeconomic policies 
as much as possible to independent, non-majoritarian agencies or let rules govern 
macroeconomic stabilization.  
In Schelkle (2005, 2006), I criticized the disciplinarian approach to macroeconomic 
policy that results from this approach in EU policymaking. In this paper, the crisis of 
2007-09 is used as a natural experiment, to analyze the operation of what were 
supposed to be economically sound and effective institutions, and assess their 
success according to the criteria of their proponents. The main findings are that the 
two good governance regimes delivered a surprisingly similar amount of 
stabilization in the first round of crisis management although the institutions of 
regulatory oversight, fiscal rules, and independent central banks fared rather 
differently. In the US, central bank independence was temporarily suspended and 
regulatory oversight became less visible while both were conspicuous and even 
reinforced in the EU. By contrast, fiscal rules on state budgets were observed in the 
US but suspended in the EU. This paper advances an analysis of the difference in 
terms of contestation over the boundaries between macroeconomic stabilization and 
distributive politics. Paradoxically and contrary to what the philosophy of good 
governance states, prioritizing economic stability in a crisis meant that US authorities 
had to ignore the boundaries drawn by these institutions while member states in the 
                                                        
1 In the words of Hix (1998: 39) who critically reviews the concept for European studies: ‘[T]he 
key governance function is “regulation” of social and political risk, instead of resource 
“redistribution”. The result is a new “problem-solving” rather than bargaining style of decision-
making.’ 
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EU insisted on respecting them for political reasons, even though this was 
economically destabilizing.  
In the next section, I summarize how the consensus on good governance was 
implemented in the EU and the US. The following section will show how different 
the responses in the EU and the US were, but also that the amounts of fiscal stimulus 
and monetary easing are not as different as the difference in policy inputs leads one 
to expect. The final section explains that the rationale of good economic governance 
institutions is political. 
2. Good governance innovations in the EU and the US  
The institutions analysed here originated in the experience of the 1970s when 
capitalist democracies came to be seen as suffering from inherent deficit and inflation 
biases. The building blocks of the emerging paradigm were independent central 
banks, transparently and actively pursuing inflation control, and fiscal policy 
constrained either by policy rules or independent agencies of oversight that prevent 
political business cycles, policy surprises and pork-barrel politics. Since 
microeconomic incentives would work in a predictable policy environment, macro-
prudential supervision of the financial system – in contrast to risk regulation of 
individual institutions -- was seen as largely superfluous (Brunnermeier et al 2009: 
10).  
The introduction of fiscal rules and independent central banks were novelties in 
Europe, closely related to the project of creating an Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), comprising an internal market among all EU members and a common 
currency for some. In the US, the 1980s also saw some institutional reform: a 
balanced budget rule for the federal government was introduced for the first time, 
the Federal Reserve Bank asserted its independence through money supply control 
and regulatory agencies for federal programmes were established. Some observers 
conceived this as regulatory state building, the emergence of a ‘fourth branch of 
government’ on both sides of the Atlantic, despite rather different political settings. 
Majone (1993, 1996) interpreted the EU as a regulatory state in the sense that the 
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Commission acts legitimately as an independent trustee of national democracies, 
specifically to enhance the credibility of governments’ commitment to open markets.  
The commitment to price stability can now be recognized as part of this movement, 
ensured either by ‘rules rather than discretion’ (Kydland and Prescott 1977) or 
delegation of monetary policy to independent central banks (Barro and Gordon 
1983). Majone’s interpretation draws on the US experience, although the regulatory 
state there has been the result of a power political struggle between the Presidency 
and Congress. Presidents successively gained control rights over the federal 
bureaucracy from the legislature and established a ‘managerial presidency’ (Pildes 
and Sunstein 1995: 11-15). The Fed’s new emphasis on price stability under 
Chairman Volcker since 1979 was a separate institutional development but had a 
similar goal, namely to make economic norms of stability and efficiency trump 
considerations of political expediency. The different constitutional background gives 
us the comparative variation to assess how similar institutional innovations work in 
practice and under rather extreme circumstances. Three innovations and their actual 
working will be compared: agencies for fiscal oversight, fiscal rules and independent 
central banks.  
 
2.1. Regulatory agencies for fiscal oversight 
Delegation of policymaking authority to independent agencies became popular with 
the wave of deregulation and privatisation of public utilities in the 1980s and ‘90s 
(Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 3). These regulatory bodies, ‘outside the line of 
hierarchical control or oversight by the departments of central government’ (Majone 
1996: 15), were seen as an alternative to public ownership or political control by 
ministerial bureaucracies. We can see the European Commission and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) in this light, namely as regulators of budgets whose 
decisions can only be challenged by judicial review or, informally, by non-
compliance. 
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All EU members are subject to fiscal surveillance, in the form of an annual cycle of 
peer review that assesses whether they comply with the major stipulations of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), such as having a deficit that does not normally 
exceed three per cent of GDP. The only difference between euro area members and 
other EU-members is that the latter cannot be fined under the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP). The authority for EU fiscal surveillance is split between the self-
regulatory ECOFIN Council, including the Eurogroup consisting of economic and 
finance ministers of the Euro area only, and the regulator in the guise of the 
Commission. Within the Commission, DG Ecfin (Directorate General of Economic 
and Financial Affairs) is responsible for fiscal governance and Eurostat for statistical 
governance. DG Ecfin is the more visible regulator of member states budgets, as it 
assesses member states’ annual Stability and Convergence Programmes and prepares 
decisions for the Council. Eurostat is a legally more authoritative regulator of 
member states’ fiscal accounting. Its rulings on how certain transactions affect the 
deficit or debt of general government, constitute secondary case law, are final and 
cannot be overruled by the Council (Savage 2005: 62; 192). If a member state refuses 
to comply by new accounting rules, Eurostat can decline certification of its reports 
which constitutes a breach of the Maastricht Treaty and can trigger an EDP – for 
which the cases of Portugal and France are precedents (Savage 2005: 149).  
The powers of general inspection that DG Ecfin and Eurostat wield with respect to 
the budgets of EU member states exceed anything that the federal government in the 
US can exercise over the states (Sbragia 2004: 59). There is no US equivalent to the 
annual Convergence or Stability Programmes that ministries of finance in the EU 
have to submit annually. Fiscal oversight of states’ use of funds is strictly tied to 
budgetary flows, i.e. the federal administration can attach strings only to transfer 
programmes by which it is funding states. While the EU does this as well, say for 
regional aid, this kind of control is more important in the US because federal grants 
cover a third of all state and local expenditure (Blöndal et al 2003: 52), amounting to 
about 3 per cent of US GDP. The strings attached to federal grants are controlled by 
the mighty appropriations committees of Congress and the powerful Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). The director of OMB is a ministerial level position 
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and a member of the President’s Cabinet. For the budgetary process, this 
independent agency in the presidential administration assumes the policy-making 
functions that in most countries are assigned to the Treasury. In normal times, the US 
Treasury is concerned with the daily cash management of the federal government 
and plays a secondary role for policymaking, given that the Council of Economic 
Advisors is also part of the Executive Office of the President (Blöndal et al 2003: 14, 
47).  
In budgeting, ‘the President and the Congress “co-manage” the executive branch.’ 
(Blöndal et al 2003: 39; cf Pildes and Sunstein 1995: 11-16) Once the budget is passed, 
the OMB monitors the compliance with rules at the programme and agency level. 
Congressional appropriations bills are more detailed and extensive than in any other 
OECD country, since Congress ‘often dictates specific management decisions’ 
(Blöndal et al 2003: 25).  Hence, because fiscal transfers provide the entry point for 
oversight, the US federal government ends up regulating particular expenditures but 
not the fiscal envelope of the states.  
The EU lacks controls over particular budget items, except if they raise specific issues 
of market integration. State aid rules are an important source of expenditure control. 
EU rules prescribe that both public procurement and subsidies to firms or sectors 
must observe strict non-discrimination between nationals and firms from other EU 
countries. These rules grant a number of exemptions (Art.87, s.2 and 3), e.g. for aid 
with ‘a social character’ to individuals, for promoting economic development or any 
objective that the Council has deemed worthy, as long as this aid is given on a non-
discriminatory basis and does not affect trade unduly. While this is often portrayed 
as providing loopholes for continuing an inefficient practice, the Commission and 
the Court have achieved a remarkable streamlining of state aid policies in member 
states (Blauberger 2009). The ‘state aid problem’ is partitioned into one that is 
concerned with efficiency (safeguarding competition), subject to EU regulation, and 
another concerned with legitimate redistributive objectives, left to member states. 
This draws a line in the sand between economic and political objectives with which 
governments have learnt to live.  
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In the US, the oversight over state aid is left to courts. Ever since the 19th century, the 
Supreme Court has established the so-called ‘Dormant Commerce Clause’ in case 
law prohibiting discriminatory and protectionist regulation by a state in favour of 
the economic interests of its citizens (Redlich et al 2005: ch.5). This body of case law 
applies in areas that are not explicitly covered by the Commerce Clause which gives 
the federal government the power to regulate all areas relevant to interstate 
commerce. But there is an important exception to this Dormant Commerce Clause: 
the ‘market participant exception’ says that a state may favour its own residents 
when it acts as a seller or buyer of goods and services, rather than as a market 
regulator. Regan (1986: 1193-1195) advances a rationale for this exception. Protection 
and discrimination seems to be allowed, first, whenever the state does not use 
traditional protectionist instruments, such as a tariff; and, second, when the 
intervention involves spending of the states’ own funds. Spending is less coercive 
than regulation and taxation, and is inherently limited by the budget constraint. Case 
law has thus allowed states to buy only from local providers, waive taxes (i.e. forego 
revenue) on new manufacturers locating in the state and require firms to hire only 
local workers for state-funded building works. Thus, the use of state expenditures to 
support employment or bail out firms is less tightly regulated in the US than the EU. 
 
2.2. Fiscal rules 
Another way of dealing with a deficit bias of governments has been the instrument 
of numerical rules, complementing or substituting for independent agencies 
(Wyplosz 2005). Fiscal rules in the guise of balanced budget or Golden Rules are 
nothing new but the good governance literature has explained them in terms of their 
contribution to dynamic consistency and ‘depoliticisation’ of budgetary policy 
(Kopits and Symanski 1998; European Commission 2006: 129-132). To the extent that 
stabilization is necessary at all, it should be left to automatic stabilizers, notably 
income taxes and unemployment benefits, which make for a counter-cyclical 
variation of the budget balance and support credit-constrained households directly. 
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Discretionary budgetary interventions are seen as prone to privileging some sectors, 
such as construction or public services, which distorts the allocation of resources 
beyond the recession (ECB 2009: 77-78).   
The fiscal rules of the SGP require governments specifically to avoid an ‘excessive’ 
deficit already mentioned, avoid debt of more than sixty per cent of GDP and have a 
budget ‘close to balance or in surplus’ over the business cycle. All rules are meant to 
avoid (a dynamic towards) high public debt since this would put pressure on 
monetary policy, as the Council conclusions establishing the SGP explicitly stated 
(Council 1996: para.18). The Pact was revised in 2005. Governments can now invoke 
exemptions from the deficit rule like systemic pension reforms or a sustained period 
of low – not, as previously, negative -- growth which allow postponement of steps 
towards being fined under the EDP.  
Enforcement is a weakness of supranational and national rules in the EU alike.2 
Obviously, there is a debate on whether these rules are just ‘smokescreens’ (Debrun 
and Kumar 2007) and provide incentives for ‘fiscal gimmickry’ (Von Hagen and Wolf 
2004). They are all self-imposed by sovereign actors, the ECOFIN Council in the EU, 
government agencies in member states (Wierts 2008: table 6.1, 256). But these slack 
enforcement mechanisms may not be an accident, given the absence of a stabilizing 
federal budget. The EU budget is not only small (about one per cent of EU GDP), it 
also has to be balanced annually. Thus even if it were bigger, the Community budget 
cannot vary with the business cycle. The sub-federal units (the member states) have 
effectively denied it a stabilizing role.  
The use of fiscal rules is an apparent similarity between the EU and the US. Virtually 
all US states have balanced budget rules for a long time (NASBO 2008: table 11). 
They apply annually and relate to the operational budget only, i.e. to current revenue 
and expenditures. Capital outlays for multi-year public investments may be debt-
financed but then debt or debt service limits apply (NASBO 2008: table 12). There is 
                                                        
2 For more detail see European Commission (2006: Part III). Reverse causation is a serious issue 
in these studies: governments may give themselves strong fiscal rules because they comply with 
budget constraints anyhow. 
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typically no spending without appropriation by state legislatures. But these rules 
were in place before the current onset of good governance. Only the fiscal rule at the 
federal level, the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act introduced in 1985, can be seen as an 
innovation inspired by ‘depoliticizing’ budget restraint. Yet, it did not achieve its aim 
of a federal balanced budget by 1991 and was replaced, first by the Budget 
Enforcement Act in 1990 and then the Balanced Budget Act in 1997. Since the federal 
budget went into surplus since 1999, the constraints on new programmes were 
circumvented and the Act expired in 2002. All three Acts for a federal rule were 
parliamentary initiatives (Savage and Verdun 2007: 847-857).  
How come that relatively good compliance with balanced budget rules has been 
found for many US states (Bohn and Inman 1996) while the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act failed to constrain the federal budget?  The states’ prudence is greatly 
facilitated by the opportunity of letting the federal government run the deficits when 
recession strikes. The federal government regularly grants disaster relief and 
temporary fiscal aid in times of economic downturns to states (GAO 2004). The 
budget stabilization funds that virtually all states maintain are often quite limited, 
for instance capped to not exceed 10 per cent of current revenue, and hence not able 
to smooth spending in a prolonged recession (NASBO 2008: table 19, 50). The uses 
that can be made of temporary fiscal aid are not prescribed. Aid is allocated on the 
basis of population size, not on the basis of fiscal need or capacity. Not only does this 
create windfall gains for some states, it also leads to moral hazard in that state 
governments do not build up sufficient rainy day funds of their own (GAO 2004: 5). 
The prudence of state budgets thus depends on a stabilizing federal budget which 
has been allowed to renege on complying with a balanced budget rule. This is the 
exact opposite of the EU where member states cannot rely on another tier to do the 
stabilization for them and therefore must be allowed to run deficits. 
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2.3. Independent central banks 
Until 1989, only the US, Germany and Switzerland had legally independent central 
banks (Lastra 1996: 9). The Maastricht Treaty requires all member states to make 
their central banks independent ad the ECB is the independent central bank par 
excellence.  Art. 105 states that ‘the primary objective’ of the ECB is price stability; it 
‘shall support the other economic policies in the Community’ only if this can be done 
‘without prejudice’ to price stability. The ECB not only exercises monetary policy 
autonomously but also enjoys goal independence, specifying what exactly price 
stability means (not more than two per cent inflation). The members of the Executive 
Board are appointed by the Council of Heads of State, after consultation of the 
European Parliament and the national central bank governors, and serve a non-
renewable eight year term. The President explains ECB policy regularly to the 
Monetary Committee of the European Parliament, but these hearings are low key 
events where committee members ask polite questions.  
National central banks are a buffer and an intermediary between the ECB and the 
fiscal authorities in each member state.  The capital of the ECB is held solely by (all 
EU) national central banks included in the European System of Central Banks 
(ESCB). National central banks have to pay any net losses that the ECB incurs, e.g. in 
the pursuit of the lender of last resort function (Art. 33, s.2 and Art.29, s.1 ESCB 
Statute). That is, national taxpayers would have to pay in proportion to the paid-up 
capital share of their central bank.  In turn, if national central banks bail out domestic 
financial institutions that have significant business in other member states, the ECB 
can compensate that central bank for the losses incurred out of its surplus from 
seignorage (Art. 32, s.4, ESCB Statute). This holds of course only as long as the ECB 
makes a profit, which may not be the case, for instance if the Euro revalues strongly 
causing losses on foreign exchange reserves. What needs stressing here is that there 
are redistribution mechanisms between member states that work through the 
‘burden-sharing’ between the ECB and national central banks (Pauly 2010: fn 3). 
These are redistribution mechanisms that are beyond the reach of legislatures; 
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neither the European Parliament nor national parliaments have a say in when or how 
they are used. 
The very independence of the ECB stands in the way of giving it a decision-making 
role in financial supervision.3 If it could directly engage in rescue operations for 
cross-border banks in the EU, say by buying shares of such a bank (recapitalisation) 
or buying bad assets from a bank, this could lead to large bills for Treasuries to foot. 
After all, the assets of or from the troubled bank have been doubtful, triggering a 
rescue operation in the first place, and may have to be written off at least in part. This 
can easily overstretch the ECB’s earning capacity. Thus, national Treasuries would 
have to back up the ECB if it was responsible for systemic bank bailouts. This they 
are not likely to accept, given the ECB’s independence from governments.  
The Fed is ‘independent within government’. That is, monetary policy decisions do 
not have to be ratified by other parts of the executive branch, yet the Federal Reserve 
System of 12 member banks ‘is subject to oversight’ by Congress and ‘must work 
within the framework of the overall objectives of economic and financial policy 
established by the government’ (Board 2005: 3). Congress watches this prerogative 
quite jealously. As one insider puts it, ‘the most important national political figures 
for the Fed are the chairmen of the House and Senate committees that deal with 
banking and central banking. The President clearly is secondary in importance for 
the Fed’ (Axilrod 2009: 8). These Committees can stage embarrassing public hearings 
and the Senate has to confirm the President’s appointments for the governors of the 
Board, the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman. The Chairmen’s four year terms of 
office can be renewed.  
The Fed acts a buffer for its member banks while its backing comes in turn from the 
Treasury. In what was once considered to be an extremely unlikely event, namely 
that the Fed could become insolvent, the Treasury would bail it out (Buiter 2009). 
Letters of Treasury secretary Hank Paulson are posted on the Fed’s website to give 
                                                        
3 The Council (2009: par.19) has endorsed a recommendation in the de Larosière report (2009: 
44) to introduce a European Systemic Risk Council for macro-prudential supervision, chaired by 
the ECB, although it would only be allowed to issue risk warnings to national authorities, not to 
financial institutions directly. 
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an assurance for the bailout operations since 2008.4 Unlike the ECB, the Fed has 
actual responsibilities in prudential supervision and regulation that it shares with a 
number of other agencies (Board 2005: ch.5). The Obama administration has tried to 
streamline this division or fragmentation of responsibilities in favour of a stronger 
role for the Fed but this attempt has enraged the critics of its crisis management even 
more (FT 2009a). 
The preceding section can be summarized in table 1 which also contains my 
judgment of how strong the respective dimensions are in comparison. 
Table 1 
Qualitative comparative assessment of good governance dimensions 
  European 
Union 
United States 
Powers to inspect states’ 
fiscal accounts 
Strong Non-existent 
Powers to control particular 
budget items 
Weak Strong 
 
 
Regulatory 
oversight 
Peer review of annual 
budget plans 
Medium Non-existent 
State level Weak Strong 
Fiscal rules 
Central level Strong Non-existent 
Independence Strong Medium 
Accountability to Parliament Weak Strong 
 
Independent 
central bank Backing for lender-of-last 
resort function 
Weak Strong 
Summary 
Score 
Strong=3, Medium=2, 
Weak=1 
 
15 
 
14 
 
While not too much weight should be placed on any single classification as weak or 
strong, it is striking that the two economic governance regimes differ, perhaps not 
surprisingly, in every dimension and yet the overall score is fairly similar. This was 
the starting point for the comparison between apparently idiosyncratic cases – there 
is plenty of variation within a shared post-Golden Age consensus that good 
economic governance requires non-majoritarian institutions which depoliticize 
macroeconomic stabilization.
                                                        
4 URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_reportsresources.htm 
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3.  The response to the crisis in the EU and the US  
compared 
The financial and economic crisis since 2007 is a stress test for any policy framework 
that wants to ensure ‘economically sound’, in contrast to politically expedient, 
macroeconomic stabilization. The indicators that the worst may be over remain 
ambiguous even two years into a crisis that started officially in August 2007 and 
reached its climax with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The 
interest here is to see to what extent the responses have observed the norms of good 
governance, specifically isolating stabilization from distributive politics in 
legislatures. The analysis is confined to the first wave of stimulus programmes. The 
most notable feature of responses to this crisis was a revival of fiscal activism, so I 
start with this. 
 
3.1. Fiscal responses 
In the beginning, the effectiveness of governments was measured in how big a 
stimulus package they could put together at short notice. The US won hands-down 
on this media account, an impression created by bank bailouts of truly astonishing 
proportions. However, they may do little for stimulating demand and employment.  
Bank bailouts served to maintain the solvency of banks but hardly managed to 
expand new credit to firms and households. Banks kept reserves and central bank 
credit on their balances or reduced more expensive debt vis-à-vis other creditors 
(‘deleveraging’). And monetary tightening will set in as soon as credit expansion 
began to revive. 
To start with discretionary fiscal interventions: The US federal government was first 
in passing bold measures under the outgoing Bush administration. It enacted a fiscal 
stimulus package in the first half of 2008 that consisted mainly of sending $100 
billion worth of tax rebates directly to households (Broda and Parker 2008). President 
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Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in mid-
February 2009 authorizing the spending of $787 billion over two years. The agency of 
fiscal oversight, the OMB, developed and monitored the standard terms and 
conditions for all grants and contracts; a board of inspectors general was entrusted 
with overseeing the disbursement of funds by federal agencies. A dedicated website 
has been set up that allows tracking the use of funds.5 
The European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP), agreed in mid-December 2008, had a 
volume of €200 billion for 2009 ($256 billion). The Plan added up and provided a 
common framework for what member states were spending to fight the crisis. The 
EU budget provides only a fraction of this sum, namely €30 billion. The Commission 
maintains a dedicated website that has a chronology of measures taken at member 
state level, that have to be scrutinised and approved by the Commission, mostly 
under the pretext of state aid rules but also under fiscal surveillance.6  
At the time that the EERP was agreed, the projected shortfall in demand was 
considerably smaller than the estimates seven months later but these in turn 
appeared too pessimistic in autumn 2009. We can see in this uncertainty of 
macroeconomic data one of the reasons why governments may want to delegate 
policymaking authority to independent agencies. It is politically risky for 
majoritarian actors to take responsibility for data-driven decisions. Elected politicians 
are not supposed to be driven by data but by political values, yet in emergencies 
these values provide little guidance.  
The estimated size of these fiscal stimulus packages are given in table 2, both what 
the IMF (break-down in annual figures and total, from March 2009) and the OECD 
(total, June 2009) have published, to account for the considerable uncertainty in the 
data.7 For reasons of clarity, only the biggest EU member states are listed, counting 
for about 80 per cent of EU GDP. Neither figure of the total includes liquidity or 
                                                        
5 At URL: www.recovery.gov 
6 At URL: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/focuson/focuson13254_en.htm  
7 The OECD shows the stimulus as share of the 2008 GDP which tends to give lower figures, in 
particular for Continental Europe as these economies started to shrink in 2009 only. The OECD 
figure also takes no account of discretionary measures of US state which are overall pro-cyclical 
and thus reduce the effective stimulus shown (OECD 2009: 60, fn.5). 
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recapitalisation measures for the financial sector because these (‘below-the-line’) 
budget operations have an uncertain and at best indirect effect on demand, as 
outlined above.  
Table 2 
Estimated contribution of discretionary fiscal measures 2008-2010 (% of GDP) 
 2008 2009 2010 IMF Total OECD Total 
France 0.0 -0.7 -0.7 -1.4 -0.7 
Germany 0.0 -1.5 -2.0 -3.5 -3.2 
Italy  0.0 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 0.0 
Spain -1.9 -2.3 n.a. -4.2 -3.9 
UK -0.2 -1.4 -0.1 -1.5 -1.9 
United 
States 
-1.1 -2.0 -1.8 -4.9 -5.6 
Source: IMF (2009: Table 4); OECD (2009: Table 1.7, as share of 2008 GDP) 
Note: ‘The figures have been corrected for: (i) “below-the-line” operations that do not impact the 
fiscal balance; and (ii) the fact that in some countries part of the announced stimulus included 
measures that were already planned for.’ (IMF 2009: 13; similarly OECD 2009: 60) 
What is noteworthy about the figures for Europe is the diversity of responses, 
contradicting the view that the fiscal framework imposes a one-size-fits-all policy. It 
also shows that rhetoric is typically the opposite of action: while the German 
government has been vocal about the need for fiscal restraint, it decided on one of 
the larger discretionary packages, while France and the UK, urging their European 
neighbours to go for large interventions, stimulated much less. The UK was 
hampered by fiscal overstretch due to massive bank bailouts while the discrepancy 
between rhetoric and action in the French position indicates a wait-and-see attitude 
which was alleged to mark the EU’s response to the crisis (Krugman 2009). 
Observing Germany’s hypocrisy and Spain’s decisiveness suggests, however, that 
this does not apply across the board. 
In the US, about half of the projected shortfalls of state budgets, to the tune of $250 
billion through 2011, are covered by $135 billion federal grants and distributed on 
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the basis of existing formulas (Scheppach 2009). These additional general funds8 
primarily free up states’ matching funds for Medicaid and education which can then 
be re-programmed. In particular the Medicaid formula guarantees that federal funds 
go to states that are hardest hit by unemployment in the course of which individuals 
lose occupational health care insurance. ARRA also devoted considerable resources 
to increase state spending on unemployment benefits raising compensation levels 
(by $25 per week), eligibility (e.g. to part-time workers) and duration (up to 18 
months instead of 6 months).9 This is against the background that by December 2008, 
thirty states were bound to run out of funds for their employer-financed 
unemployment insurance, two (Indiana and Michigan) had already become 
insolvent (Herald Tribune 2009). States are then forced to restrict access, raise 
contributions from employers or borrow from the federal government at a cost of 4.7 
per cent interest if not repaid within the fiscal year. To avoid more pro-cyclical 
measures, the package of February 2009 created a new programme (Federal 
Additional Compensation) that offers interest-free loans to states until June 2010.   
There are no systematic differences in the substance of stimulus measures between 
Europe and the US. As table 3 shows, all packages combine temporary expenditure 
increases with largely permanent revenue reduction. With the exception of Italy, all 
support infrastructure investment, social safety nets and environmentally-friendly 
technology, and all reduce personal income taxes. None aims directly to increase 
public employment. That is, we can discern a clear attempt to avoid lasting 
expenditure increases and a startling optimism that tax revenues can be cut 
permanently, but no big difference between advanced OECD countries.  
 
                                                        
8 In contrast to the remaining $140 billion ARRA funds for states that go to specific programmes 
controlled by the federal government. 
9 This is Title II of ARRA, the so-called ‘Assistance for Unemployed Workers and Struggling 
Families Act’. For a summary see http://www.naswa.org/recovery/ . Overall, the states receive 
$275 billion of the total $787 billion ARRA funds. 
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Table 3 
Types of stimulus measures, 2008-2010 (as announced by 28 February 2009) 
 FR GE IT SP UK US 
Expenditure measures   
Infrastructure investment T T  T S T 
Support for SMEs  T     
Social safety nets T T T T T T 
Housing/construction support T T  T T  
Strategic industries support  T  T   
Public employment       
Other (green technology subsidies etc) T T  T T T 
Revenue measures  
Corporate tax reduction/ depreciation P P/T    P 
Personal income tax reduction  T P  P P P 
Indirect tax reduction (VAT etc)  P  S S  
Other     P  
Source: IMF (2009: Table 5) 
T: Temporary measures (with explicit sunset provisions or time-bound spending) 
S: Self-reversing measures (costs of which will be recouped by compensatory measures in future years) 
P: Permanent measures (with recurrent fiscal costs) 
How much did automatic stabilizers contribute, i.e. revenue and expenditure items 
(such as income taxes or unemployment benefits) that make budget balances vary 
counter-cyclically with booms and recessions even if the government does not take 
any discretionary action? Table 4 gives the contribution of automatic stabilization, 
based on the latest OECD measures for budget elasticities which do not change much 
over time (Girouard and André 2005): a figure of 0.53 means that the budget balance 
declines by about half a per cent in response to a negative output gap of one per cent. 
The contribution of automatic stabilization is a result, first, of this strength with 
which budget items respond, and, second, the size of output gaps. A figure like -2.0 
(estimate for France in 2009) means that the budget balance is projected to go into 
deficit in response to the cyclical downturn, adding about two per cent to aggregate 
demand.  
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Table 4 
Estimated contribution of automatic stabilisation (as % of GDP) 
2008 2009 2010  Overall budget 
responsivenessa OGap AutStab OGap AutStab OGap AutStab 
France 0.53 0.2 0.1 -4.1 -2.0 -4.9 -2.5 
Germany 0.51 1.9 1.0 -5.4 -2.7 -5.7 -2.9 
Italy  0.53 -0.9 -0.5 -6.5 -3.4 -5.8 -3.1 
Spain 0.44 -0.9 -0.4 -6.5 -2.9 -8.2 -3.6 
UK 0.45 0.4 0.2 -5.4 -2.4 -6.4 -2.9 
USA 0.33 -0.5 -0.2 -4.9 -1.6 -5.4 -1.8 
Source: Girouard and André (2005: table 9), OECD (2009: 71), own calculations 
a  Sum of the elasticities for corporate, personal income and indirect taxes, social security 
contributions and for all current expenditure (mostly unemployment compensation). 
OGap  Output Gap is the deviation of actual output from estimated potential output as % of 
potential GDP, published by the OECD in June 2009. 
AutStab Automatic Stabilisation, ie the estimated annual change of the budget balance as % of 
GDP; calculated by multiplying the measure of overall budget responsiveness by the 
annual output gap.  
The second column of table 4 shows that budgets of European countries are about 25-
40 per cent more responsive than in the United States. This is no surprise. Ceteris 
paribus, automatic stabilizers are more effective the larger the size of government, 
the more progressive the income tax system, and the larger the share of cyclically 
responsive budget items such as corporate taxes or unemployment benefits. On all 
these accounts, Europe’s more generous welfare systems and more burdensome tax 
states are bound to be more effective than the US (Girouard and André 2005: 20-25).  
General government expenditure in the US is about thirty per cent of GDP, two 
thirds of which by the federal goverment (Blöndal et al 2003: 52), below the OECD 
average of over forty per cent. The stabilizing effect of the US federal budget is partly 
undone by the pro-cyclical effect of state and local fiscal policies (Follette et al. 2008). 
By contrast, the EU budget balance does not contribute anything; it is too small and 
does not vary with the business cycle.  
Tables 2-4 suggest that the US and the EU are not that different as regards the policy 
output of overall fiscal stabilization and the concrete steps taken. Adding up the 
fiscal contribution to aggregate demand as calculated in tables 2 and 4 shows that the 
estimated US stimulus over three years (8.5 per cent of GDP) is not much higher than 
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the UK’s (6.8 per cent), similar to Germany’s (8.1 per cent), and lower than Spain’s 
(11.1 per cent). Most of the differences are accounted for by differences in the 
evolving output gaps. This is contrary to what most commentators suggest. The 
impression was created because the US intervention was much more visible in bank 
bailouts and the drama of stimulus packaging played out in Congress. European 
countries relied more on automatic stabilizers or downplayed the extent of their 
discretionary intervention in the case of Germany.  
Relying on automatic stabilization in the member states spared EU governments the 
political drama in the Council of having to agree on joined, yet tailored fiscal action 
for a heterogeneous union with diverse needs and capacities, in the spotlight of 
national media which would closely watch how the costs are shared. The reliance on 
automatic stabilizers can be justified on the same grounds as other good governance 
institutions although it usually is not (Mabbett and Schelkle 2007: 87-88). Thus, the 
different mix of discretionary and automatic measures in the fiscal stimulus of the US 
and the EU is evidence for the Europeans relying more on good governance 
institutions –not because they are inherently more attracted by these principles but 
because these institutions compensate to some extent for the unwillingness or 
inability to coordinate their policies in the absence of centralised fiscal authority.  
 
3.2. Monetary responses 
Both central banks, the ECB and the Fed, responded with an unprecedented injection 
of liquidity and adopted ‘unorthodox measures’, even though heterodoxy means 
something different for the two. The Fed brought down interest rates within 2008 by 
four per cent to a target policy rate of zero to 0.25 per cent.  It first expanded the 
money supply by lending directly to banks and then through outright purchase of 
commercial papers, thus expanding bank reserves massively (Kuttner 2008: 2-5). This 
quantitative easing extended to the public sector from 2009 onwards. By monetizing 
public debt, the Fed replenished its holding of Treasury securities that were lent to 
the private sector in operations of qualitative easing, taking privately-issued 
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securities of less liquidity and higher insolvency risk as collateral. The Federal 
Reserve System also engaged in massive bailouts of individual institutions since 
March 2008: of Bear Stearns and of the American Insurance Group (through three 
Maiden Lane LLC facilities and additional lending to AIG), the latter being 
particularly noticeable as AIG is not a bank. The initial support for Citigroup and 
Bank of America was off-balance sheet and subsequently passed on to the Treasury.10 
The bailout of individual institutions was a major driver of the Fed’s budget 
expansion, as Maiden Lane I-III and the AIG facility accounted for almost 10% of the 
Fed’s balance sheet at the end of 2008 when it had doubled in size (cf Kuttner 2008: 
16). These rescue operations behind closed doors triggered a bipartisan motion in 
Congress (H.R.1207 and S.604), signed by over 300 representatives in the House and 
over 30 Senators, calling for a detailed audit of the Fed (FT 2009a; cf Hubbard et al 
2009). 
The ECB was keen not to expand bank reserves through asset purchases massively 
and raised the interest rate by 0.25 per cent as late as July 2008, against a backdrop of 
rising inflation to double its target rate. But it provided ample liquidity by 
lengthening the maturity of loans that banks could obtain, from twenty-eight days to 
three and six months, at a fixed rate and the entire amount they wanted. In normal 
times, banks get just a share of an overall given amount at a variable rate, depending 
on the bidding process of all banks. The ECB allowed for some innovation in 
liquidity management only, i.e. in lending to banks against collateral, not in asset 
purchases (ECB 2009: 32, 35; Bini-Smaghi 2009). Weber, the German member of the 
executive board, pointed out that the bank-based financial system of the Euro area 
does not require the same amount of creativity as a frozen capital market-based 
system (FT 2009b). That is to say, in order to pump liquidity into the economy the 
ECB could use the traditional channels of monetary policy, lending to banks, and did 
not deal in capital market instruments that blur the line to investment banking.11  
                                                        
10 URL: http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/bst_supportspecific.htm 
11 Chancellor Merkel also made it quite clear that she would oppose anything more creative by 
the ECB when the bank announced one small asset purchase programme of covered bonds (FT 
2009d). She thus engaged in a calculated break of the taboo that German governments do not 
comment monetary policy.  
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Between October 2008 and March 2009, the ECB brought down interest rates by 2.75 
per cent to the minimum target rate of one per cent where it stayed. The one 
‘unorthodox measure’ the ECB was ready to take was qualitative easing (ECB 2009: 
103-104; 107-109). Assets became eligible collateral even if traded in non-regulated 
markets, or rated BBB-, indicating a high insolvency risk. Other unprecedented steps 
included the ECB lending five and ten billion Euro to the Hungarian and the Polish 
central banks, respectively, in fall 2008, thus supporting their commercial banks 
which consist largely of foreign subsidiaries and branches from Austria, Belgium, 
Germany, and Italy. The ECB also agreed to introduce swap lines under which 
central banks can automatically draw on currency facilities from each other; not only 
with the US Fed and the Swiss central bank which are obvious providers of world 
liquidity, but also with the Swedish central bank.12 This happened in light of the 
rapidly deteriorating financial conditions in the Baltic states where Swedish banks 
are heavily engaged.  
Rescue operations for individual banks are a matter for national authorities in 
Europe, even when cross-border banks are involved. A dramatic bailout was staged 
for the ‘Euro bank’ Fortis, noticeable not only because of its sheer size but also for the 
presence of the ECB President at the talks between three member states 
(Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg). It ended with a break-up of the bank in 
three national entities, each government taking a forty-nine per cent share in their 
country’s Fortis, at a total cost of €11.2 billion ($16.1 billion) (BBC 2008). Rival Dexia 
faltered on the Fortis news two days later; the world’s biggest lender to local 
governments had to be thrown a lifeline by the French and Belgian governments, to 
the tune of €6.4 billion ($9.2 billion) (Bloomberg 2008). In neither case was there any 
news about engagement of the ECB directly or indirectly through national central 
banks, although the Dutch and the Belgium central banks were involved. 
Despite considerable differences in how monetary crisis management was 
conducted, there are similarities in policy output, specifically in the contribution of 
central bank credit to the economy, measured relative to GDP and relative to bank 
                                                        
12 Sweden is not a member of the Euro area. 
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credit (figures 1a and 1b). Given its capital market-based financial system, Federal 
Reserve credit started from a lower base as a share of GDP but then increased 
dramatically. The refinancing of banks was the same in relative terms in the US and 
in EMU until the Lehman collapse, but again rose more dramatically in the US after 
that. The comparison of the two measures of central bank credit to the economy also 
reveals that euro area bank credit did not shrink as much as US commercial bank 
credit; hence ECB credit as a share of GDP is still higher than in the US while it does 
not reach the same proportions relative to euro area bank credit.   
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Graph 1b 
Central bank credit relative to commercial bank credit 
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Sources: FRB and ECB for central bank and commercial bank credit, US Bureau of Economic 
Analysis and Eurostat for GDP figures 
Note: ECB credit was calculated from the Consolidated financial statement of the Eurosystem as 
Total assets of the Eurosystem except Gold assets (item 1) and claims on non-euro area 
residents denominated in foreign currency (item 2). 
The quality of assets has deteriorated in both banks’ balance sheets although the 
default risk is considerably higher for the Fed. Moreover, the Fed holds now direct 
claims against the non-bank private sector, like a commercial bank, and Treasury 
bonds that it acquired in the direct monetization of public debt, like a dependent 
central bank. The ECB, by contrast, has refrained from either. Commercial banking 
can lead to large losses and even insolvency that would force the ECB to go cap in 
hand to the Council, leading to controversy about how to split the cost of a central 
bank bailout.13 Direct lending to Treasuries would raise issues of distribution: should 
the ECB lend to members with an unsustainable deficit because they need it most or 
to members whose public finances are least in need of a cheap source of Euro 
supply? The anticipated responses of financial markets would split the Council to 
breaking point. In sum, while presumably both the Fed and the ECB have an 
institutional self-interest in keeping their independent status, only the Fed has taken 
the risk in order to fight the crisis. The ECB would have to take into account that 
                                                        
13 This can be the motive behind the criticism of the ECB (and the Fed) that Chancellor Merkel 
chose to express publicly (FT 2009d). 
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such behaviour could call the very basis of the currency union into question, with no 
more common currency to manage after the dust has settled.   
 
3.3. Regulatory responses 
The role of regulatory oversight in fiscal crisis management is, at first sight, 
predictably different in the EU and the US. What is perhaps less predictable is that 
the Commission does not relent in its regulation of budgets while the federal 
government in the US, despite its huge fiscal leverage, exercises rather lenient 
oversight over the spending of its funds in the states.  
The Commission keeps on recommending the opening of excessive deficit 
procedures, for instance as early as March 2009, against Euro area members which 
had structural – not cyclical -- deficits above three per cent of national GDP in 2008 
already (France, Greece, Ireland, and Spain). The press statement14 stresses that 
member states ‘rightly adopted’ discretionary measures but that the SGP should be 
seen as a framework for an ‘exit strategy’ from rapidly increasing debt burdens. The 
Commission has reiterated this message continuously, so as to justify why the 
exemption clause -- no EDP against a country with low or negative growth rates – is 
not invoked instead. Recommending an EDP puts the issue on the agenda of the 
Ecofin Council. It must then come up with reasons why it is not following the 
recommendation of the Commission and the deficit country must outline a strategy 
to get back to normal.   
The contrast with the US is stark. Against the backdrop of projected budget deficits 
in the two digits for 2009 and 2010, the Obama administration still puts its emphasis 
on the accountability to the current taxpayer rather than the burden on future 
taxpayers:  ‘The President has made it clear that every taxpayer dollar spent on our 
economic recovery must be subject to unprecedented levels of transparency and 
                                                        
14 IP /09/458 
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accountability’.15 To be sure, there is great unease among independent and 
conservative voters, from which the Republican opposition benefits, to the point 
where it jeopardizes health care reform. But the state finances are in such dire straits 
that there is little opposition raised by state legislatures.16  
Figure 2 shows the evolution of budget deficits in the form of cash balances 
unadjusted for cyclical effects. This is how parliaments (and concerned voters) see 
budgets, namely including public resources that went into bank bailouts to prop up 
their reserves as well as the net spending triggered by automatic stabilizers, although 
it is not really an economically ‘correct’ view of the stimulus, which is shown by 
tables 1 and 3.   
Graph 2 
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15At URL: http://www.recovery.gov/?q=content/accountability-and-transparency  
16 See Fehr (2009) for an overview of the debate as of fall 2009. 
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In the EU, an immediate test for its regulatory role of preventing negative side-effects 
of national crisis management came in early October 2008. The Irish Parliament 
passed legislation to give a blanket guarantee for two years to all deposits and bonds 
held in six Irish banks, worth an estimated €400 billion. Greece followed suit for its 
national banks. The British, French and German authorities protested vehemently 
against these discriminatory measures. But a few days later Germany went on to 
guarantee savings in all banks operating in Germany. Although non-discriminatory, 
adopting such measures raised the spectre of competitive bidding for savings and a 
spread of banking crises all over Europe, particularly after British banks experienced 
a noticeable loss of deposits to Irish banks (Timesonline 2008). The Commission 
moved quickly and got, by mid-October, the agreement from the ECOFIN Council 
for an amended Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes17. It stipulates a minimum 
amount to be guaranteed (€100,000 at the end of 2009; possibly confined to 90 per 
cent of the deposit) and accelerated pay-out (within three days rather than three 
months). The difference to the budgetary solution in the US is telling: there the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation provides a nation-wide guarantee which 
precludes a destabilizing competition for deposits. But the funds at its disposal have 
also made it attractive to divert the FDIC to the purpose of bank restructuring under 
the Geithner-Summers plan of March 2009, i.e. insuring bank shareholders directly 
while the normal task of deposit insurance is to insure savers only (Sachs 2009).  
Another test case for regulatory oversight is the control of state aid. The EU’s state 
aid rules were immediately challenged when governments in France, Spain, Britain, 
Italy, Germany and Sweden rushed to the rescue of their national car industries 
(EUobserver 2009). The French government triggered a storm of protest in Central 
Eastern Europe when it initially conditioned its €6.5 billion support for Renault and 
Peugeot on the stipulation of no plant closures in France for five years, which 
implied imminent plant closures in the Czech Republic instead. The French 
government withdrew the condition on 25 February. The Commission stepped in 
resolutely, presenting a Communication on guidelines for admissible support of the 
                                                        
17 The draft directive is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/guarantee/dgs_proposal_en.pdf .  
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car industry (EUobserver 2009).18 Subsidies to households for scrapping their old cars 
must not discriminate against any supplier, no matter whether it is foreign or a 
national brand. Aid should be limited to firms with liquidity problems that did not 
have well-known problems pre-dating the crisis, preferably through indirect 
measures that support consumer demand and make banks provide credit. But state 
aid rules regarding public guarantees or subsidised loans for the industry have been 
relaxed for a limited time of 2-3 years. The German government’s rescue package for 
Opel from June 2009 is now testing these relaxed rules before the Commission. On 23 
September, shortly before the German elections, the Commission raised concerns 
about possibly discriminatory protection of jobs in German plants reminding 
authorities that the Temporary Framework of relaxed state aid rules does not allow 
to give state aid conditional upon ‘a specific business plan ... which defines the 
geographic distribution of restructuring measures’ (European Commission 2009). 
The Commission was bolstered by the outrage that the Opel deal triggered in other 
member states, above all in Belgium, Spain and the UK. 
In the US, the initial guidelines of the stimulus plan do not contain an explicit 
prohibition of states’ discriminatory use of federal grants by the regulator, the OMB. 
There is no reference to ‘protection’ or to ‘discrimination’ with reference to states 
(OMB 2009: para.1.6). A House amendment to an energy and waters appropriations 
bill in summer 2009 stipulated that ‘none of the funds made available in this Act may 
be used to purchase passenger motor vehicles other than those manufactured by 
Ford, GM and Chrysler’. It is unlikely to survive the vote in the Senate because it 
violates international trade law, but not because there are national rules that prohibit 
discrimination, for instance against car manufacturers in the Southern states of the 
US where foreign manufacturers are mainly located (FT 2009c: 5). In contrast to 
discrimination, however, it is not allowed for states to use ARRA to substitute for 
their own spending. The Inspector General of the Department of Education has 
raised the issue of an ‘inappropriate use’ of funds in over a dozen of states, that is 
                                                        
18 See URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/com_2009_010
4.pdf , annexes and other documents can be found at URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/automotive/pagesbackground/competitiveness/index.htm. 
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states cutting their own spending on public education and substituting federal funds. 
By October 2009, one state seems to have been blocked from accessing federal funds 
for cuts that went too deep, namely to levels below state spending in 2006 (NPR 2009; 
OIG 2009). In contrast to the EU, the frontline here is between states and federal 
government, not between states. 
 
4. Good governance in crisis or a good crisis for 
governance? 
The response of the Obama administration was bold and unorthodox, largely 
unrestrained by concerns for the Fed’s independence and its balance sheet as an 
effective monetary authority19. The regulatory oversight of the normally quite 
powerful Office of Management and Budget has retreated to the background; the 
collective action problems of joint stabilization and negative spillovers from state 
action were overridden by the Treasury’s takeover, providing ad hoc substitutes for 
the weak social safety nets and counterbalancing effectively the pro-cyclical fiscal 
policies in the states. European crisis management, by contrast, relied heavily on 
national safety nets and built-in stabilizers. There was a great variety of responses 
even among the five big member states. EU regulatory oversight could contain 
spillover from national actions, yet there was little joint stabilization effort. Devolved 
fiscal responses by Euro area members put the ECB into the role of the most decisive, 
visible policymaker at the EU level although it was considerably less ‘creative’ than 
its US counterpart.  
To put it somewhat simplistically, good governance is in crisis in the US – fiscal 
discretion on a massive scale took the lead, with monetary policy acting as the ‘off-
budget, off-balance-sheet and off-the-Congressional-radar-screen’ (Buiter 2009) arm 
of the Treasury. Even the compliance with fiscal rules in the states can be seen as 
                                                        
19 Effectiveness requires that the bank’s claims on the economy are of shorter maturity than 
those of other financial institutions or that it holds instruments like Treasury bonds that can be 
sold at fixed nominal value in secondary markets.  
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problematic if they lead to discretionary expenditure cuts that override (the small) 
automatic stabilizers.20 In the EU, it was a good crisis for governance, at least until 
autumn 2009. Member states accepted the intervention of the Commission to avoid 
the worst in terms of discrimination and protection while the ECB was unusually 
alert and avoided bank runs or currency crises in its neighborhood. The fiscal rules 
enshrined in the Stability Pact were broken, yet economic commentators thought 
they were not broken decisively enough (De Grauwe 2009).   
However, it is misleading to describe the US response as a politicization of 
stabilization, as the proponents of good governance institutions are inclined to do.21 
After all, the concentration and dominance of fiscal authority put all politics under 
the imperative of economic stabilization. The exact opposite to politicization, namely 
the economization of politics as we know it, would be an equally valid 
characterization. What seems therefore a more plausible description is that the 
tsunami of this crisis wiped out the lines in the sand that good governance 
institutions try to draw between macroeconomic stabilization and distributive 
politics. It could do so because major forces, political at the state level and economic 
in the financial sector, decided not to erect many defenses. It was the only way to 
square the circle of a collapse in revenues and balanced budget rules. They exploited 
the fact that the federal government’s hands were forced by the unfolding events, 
driven, paradoxically, by it being the only actor with the enormous resources 
required to avoid disaster. The collapse of Lehman in September 2008 and its 
aftermath sent exactly this message. Hence, the states got ‘flexibility inherent in the 
maintenance of effort requirements’ (OIG 2009: 1) for getting the ARRA funds – 
which invited quite a few of them to freeride and substitute federal for state finances. 
From the point of view of governance, it is a paradox of the weakness of strength.   
But why did good governance institutions prove to be so robust in the EU, against 
the odds? Most observers predicted renationalization and a general meltdown of 
                                                        
20 Table 1 suggests that those institutions had to give which were not strong, if they existed at all. 
21 For instance, see Meltzer (2009) for blaming the Fed under Bernanke; Edward Prescott blamed 
discretionary macroeconomic policies for the recession in an interview on Bloomberg on 30 
March 2009.   
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Community institutions, with few exceptions (Pauly 2009).  To be sure, there was 
evidence of protectionism and a weakening of the Commission during the French 
Presidency in the first half of 2009. Domestic politics as usual was not suspended. 
But the pervasive and severe character of this crisis was a blessing in disguise for 
cooperation in that it concentrated governments’ minds, made them concede that 
nationalism had to be reined in and appreciate the insurance inherent in a stable 
common currency. Members accepted shared sovereignty over emergency measures 
for the national economy, as long as they did not require any permanent institutional 
changes such as joint fiscal policy or giving the ECB decisive powers as a financial 
supervisor. Due to the weakness of the EU as a polity and the dominance of domestic 
politics, leaders cling to established institutions which preserve the boundaries 
between economic stabilization and distributive politics. However, the boundaries as 
drawn, namely to assign political responsibility to the member states and economic 
rationality to the EU level, are dysfunctional for joint fiscal stabilization efforts.  
The Greek turmoil since December 2009 is beyond the time horizon of this paper, but 
readers may well ask whether it does not prove that the EU’s good governance 
institutions have become obsolete.  To me, it rather shows how strong political 
preferences for the status quo are. In a Postscript at the end of this paper, I go 
through the significant changes and reform proposals to support my case.  
Hence, we may conclude that, in order to stabilize effectively, the US had to suspend 
the good governance principles of refraining from fiscal activism, ensuring the 
material independence of the central bank from the Treasury, and exercising 
budgetary oversight under the norm of economic efficiency. At the EU level, by 
contrast, good governance institutions have proven their political value to 
governments throughout this crisis, especially since the lack of joined-up 
stabilization efforts has not hindered reasonably effective crisis management 
domestically. Good governance institutions still have their political uses, especially 
in such weak polities as the EU. But they are not the embodiment of economic 
rationality that their proponents once thought.  
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Postscript: The Greek crisis and good governance 
In this section, written in May 2010, I do not intend to give a full account of the Greek 
crisis but address the sensible objection that it was not such a good crisis for EU 
governance after all. The main protagonists in this drama, be it ECB President 
Trichet, Eurogroup President Junker or Chancellor Merkel, would certainly support 
this objection. However, I argue that the crisis highlights the features of the existing 
framework that make it politically so attractive and economically so costly. And the 
imminent or proposed reforms do not fundamentally change these features but try to 
amend them incrementally. 
There is first the heavy reliance of crisis management on monetary policy, or more 
precisely: on the ECB as the one European actor with an effective macropolicy. The 
Greek turmoil was partly triggered when the ECB President signaled its exit strategy, 
namely that its ‘unorthodox’ measure of accepting bonds with BBB- rating would be 
phased out in 2010. This raised the prospect that Greek bonds which had just been 
downgraded would become ineligible for banks’ refinancing operations with the 
ECB, so banks started to sell them. The ECB then reversed its plans with 
astonishingly specific reference to Greece: ‘The Eurosystem’s credit quality threshold 
shall not apply to marketable debt instruments issued by the Greek Government.’ 
(ECB 2010a) The ECB thus bailed out commercial banks which had bought Greek 
bonds and then used them as collateral when borrowing from the ECB (Tett 2010). 
Four days later, the ECB had to announce that it would directly buy public and 
private debt instruments, but duly sterilize their impact on money supply.22  This 
sequence of events reveals how fragile are the lines in the sand that good governance 
institutions try to draw between monetary and fiscal policy. And the sequence 
illustrates that the ECB is another example for the weakness of strength, analogous to 
the federal fiscal authorities in the US: because there is no other actor who could 
effectively stabilize, it had to break all its self-inflicted taboos. But at least it has 
broken the taboos of its own choosing and preserved its independent status for the 
time being. 
                                                        
22 This is exactly the policy that the Bundesbank adopted when the rules of the European Monetary System 
forced it to symmetric intervention in order to stabilize currencies under devaluation pressure.   
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The lessons for fiscal surveillance that are drawn from the Greek turmoil are so far: 
more of the same. The Commission has come out with a Communication on 
‘Reinforcing economic policy coordination’ (European Commission 2010), to be 
discussed at a Council in June, that proposes extending and hardening the SGP. It 
should be extended to excessive debt and to inadequate debt reduction in good times 
and hardened by speeding up the process and suspending the payment of cohesion 
funding earlier in an EDP.23 The Communication also proposes a ‘European 
semester’ for economic policy coordination which, in essence, means that there will 
be peer review of budget plans at the EU level before they go to national parliaments 
later in the year. This idea had already been ventured and ignored in the Pact reform 
of 2005. While the Commission seems to think that this is just a matter of regulatory 
oversight of majoritarian budget policy, ie a logical extension of the Pact, this would 
certainly politicize fiscal surveillance in a way that spells future public relation 
disasters for the Union. If the peer review is at odds with what the majority in a 
national parliament wants, there will be a public stand-off in which the Commission 
loses the case and all lose face. 
Governments were forced to accept one innovation, namely credit support for 
countries in distress that ultimately draws on national budgets. The permanent 
shape of this credit facility is likely to follow the IMF role model. Hence, it will 
become another good governance institution with standard procedures and 
programmes that require political endorsement from governments only at the very 
end of negotiations between the Fund and a national Treasury. But this innovation 
does nothing for coordinated macroeconomic stabilization (Mabbett and Schelkle 
2010: 83). The institutional status quo of fiscal good governance is thus well 
preserved by the lack of support for a political union. In fiscal terms, a political union 
to back up monetary unification would require a central budget and some degree of 
joint public debt management. In the absence of democratic approval, the EU relies 
on the automatic stabilizers built into its welfare states for counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy. 
                                                        
23 The suspension of cohesion funding due to excessive deficits is already possible under Article 
126(8) of the Treaty. 
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